- Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia in the post-Soviet period have been rather complex and have not easily fitted into the usual framework of relations of a parent state and its former colony. Moscow's official policy towards Azerbaijan is related to the overall situation in the Caucasus, a region posing serious challenges and threats to the Russian national security. While the Caucasus is divided into North (Russian) and South (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), both of these regional sub-systems are a common geopolitical and cultural space. Thus, Russia has always understood that the effectiveness of control over "their" North Caucasus largely depends on the processes in the South Caucasus. At the same time, the South Caucasus forms a buffer zone between the Russian North Caucasus and the Islamic world, especially Turkey and Iran - two countries whose centuries-old influence in the Caucasus is traditionally perceived by Russia as a challenge to its own centuries-old interests in the region. And in the post-Soviet period, these traditional political opponents for Russia were joined by new global players in the person of the United States and the European Union. And the Western countries play a much more important role today in the Russian policy on the Caucasus and are seen as the main opponents of Russia in the region.

 

As a result, in its relations with Azerbaijan, Russia comes from the following guidelines: the role of the Islamic factor, considering the complicated situation in Chechnya and Dagestan that borders with Azerbaijan, the energy resources in the Caspian Sea, the confrontation with the West, and primarily the United States.

 

The following factors played a major role in defining Azerbaijan’s relations with its northern neighbors: the Karabakh conflict and the threat to the independence of the country; the energy resources in the Caspian Sea, labor migration by a significant portion of the population in Russia.

 

The main conflict in the relations between the parties has been associated with different approaches to the above factors. The complexity is aggravated due to the dynamically changing geopolitical situation in the region and the role of external forces. In addition to these objective factors, many stereotypes and myths about the two parties established after the start of the Karabakh conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union have impacted on the Azerbaijani- Russian relations. The uncertainty in the foreign policy orientation of the parties was another serious factor.

 

As a result, Azerbaijan and Russia meet in higher places, sign contracts, and declare the principles of friendship and cooperation. But over all the years, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union both sides have expressed mutual accusations, claims, reproaches and have been suspicious of each other. It is true that in international relations there is no outright hatred and enmity, but there relations are not friendly either. In general, in the Azerbaijani- Russian relations friendship and cooperation on the basis of suspicion and mistrust prevail.

 

 

For many reasons. First, Armenia does not have its own energy resources; therefore it lacks opportunities for a steadier economic development. In addition to this Armenia is in a complex geopolitical situation: the borders with Azerbiajan which are actually the front line today are closed because of the Karabakh conflict. It has closed borders with Turkey because of the unresolved Armenian-Turkish relations. In Armenia, there is a Russian military base and the border is guarded by the Russian troops. Plus, in fact up to 70 percent of Armenia's economy today is in one form or other under the control of Russia. But at the same time, Armenia has no common borders with Russia; the relationship is sustained by the air transport. It is possible to have ground communication with Russia through Georgia, but it is also closed due to the conflict between Georgia and Russia, which worsened after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. This leaves only the border with Iran, but it could be at a risk in the event of an escalation of the confrontation between the West and Iran. As a result, any conflict in the region, not even directly connected with Armenia, for example, the Georgian- Russian war in 2008, is a serious blow to the economy of Armenia and makes Armenia even more vulnerable. Thus, many Armenian citizens live and work in Russia largely thanks to labor migration to that country. Therefore, today for Armenia the relation with Russia is a safety issue and that of more or less tolerable economic relations. This is not to say that Armenians are very pleased joining the CU. Many people in Armenia are in favor of European integration, seeing it as a hope for better development. After all, an alliance with modern Russia, that does not accept Armenia as an equal partner and has consistently demonstrated it, cannot please Armenians. In addition, the alliance with Russia is essentially a movement back towards the revival of Soviet Armenia in some form and it may, in fact, gradually turn into a Russian province. Therefore, Armenia has long tried to balance between its strategic ally Russia and the European Union. Armenia has sought to establish and maintain good relations with Western countries, especially the European Union, seeing it as collateral for its security.

 

It is for this very reason that Armenia was in talks to sign an Association Agreement with the EU and the Agreement on the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) with the EU since 2010. And this fact has caused irritation in Moscow, and Armenia came under pressure and, therefore, at the beginning of September, the Armenian President Sargsyan gave in and agreed to join the CU.

 

In Azerbaijan, the situation is markedly different. It has its own energy resources and therefore Russia’s "gas blackmail" will not work with Azerbaijan. There is also the export of these resources through friendly Georgia to the western market, which allows Azerbaijan to feel safe in its relations with Russia and not to be afraid of pressure. In this case, Russia has two serious trump cards – the Karabakh conflict and labor migrants. However, the Karabakh conflict can be used against Azerbaijan in case of violations of the truce and the start of hostilities. But if we do not allow this and do not respond to the provocation, similar to the one organized by Russia against Georgia in August 2008, Russia will not have chances there either. As for the Azerbaijani migrants in Russia, the vast majority of them had to take Russian citizenship, and therefore even the aggravation in the Azerbaijani- Russian relations will not result in mass deportation of Azerbaijanis from Russia, because they are Russian citizens now. Thus, Azerbaijan’s joining the CU is not important from the economic point of view and is not dangerous in the event of refusal to join. And this is what actually happened. For the same reason, Azerbaijan forced Russia to close its only military base in the country (the Gabala radar) and, again, Russia was forced to swallow the bitter and unpleasant pill.

 

 

- All of the above has led to the fact that the Russian attitude to Azerbaijanis is very ambiguous. This is nicely illustrated by surveys that are conducted by different services and give the same result in relation to Russia: for many years in the polls among the population of Azerbaijan Russia steadily ranks the second among the most friendly (after Turkey) and the most unfriendly (after Armenia ) countries! That is clearly seen that for the citizens of Azerbaijan, there are "two" Russias: a friendly one, which has much in common in terms of culture and history, moreover, a Russia that is a close trading and economic partner. The "other" Russia has a hostile attitude in the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that is extremely important for Azerbaijan; it is not interested in its settlement, being the strategic ally of the enemy Armenia.

 

The situation is more complicated with the Azerbaijani Diaspora. It is largely pro-Russian, although after the Chechens Azerbaijanis came second in terms of harassments and attacks both by the authorities and the media, where the phobias of the Caucasus are largely anti-Azerbaijani in their manifestations. But the representatives of the Diaspora often blame this on the Azerbaijani authorities, believing that the passage of the country under the control of Moscow would change the situation dramatically. That is why Azerbaijan is very much wary of this or that action or claims of the so-called the leaders of the Azerbaijani Diaspora, seeing them as “the Kremlin voices", and not entities, reflecting the interests of Azerbaijan. And so, the largest Diaspora in Russia does not actually play a role in the political life of Azerbaijan or its role is in fact not felt, rather it is rejected.

 

 

- The interests of Russia and the European Union in Azerbaijan and those of Azerbaijan in Russia and the EU are too different from each other in order to really intersect. Another thing is that due to many other factors all the parties today are interested in stability and non-military operations, both on the front line of the Karabakh conflict as well as in terms of the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, especially in Iran , because it will inevitably be reflected in changes in the region. Besides, all the parties are alarmed by the increasing gain of Islamic political forces in the country and the region. This forces all the parties to seek common ground.